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Abstract: In this paper, I offer a reading of Hilary Mantel’s memoir, 
Giving Up The Ghost (2003). The interest of the memoir derives from 
the fact that it offers an exceptionally rich picture of the impact of family 
life on a child’s attitudes towards her own body. Mantel presents her 
bodily experiences as primitive, often unconscious, perceptions of the 
relationships within her family of origin. When she discovers new things 
about those relationships, she finds she has to register the change 
through her body in some way. Drawing on a range of concepts taken 
from psychoanalytic psychosomatics, I suggest that at the heart of the 
memoir is the author’s bafflement at the repeated and uncanny 
irruption of a conflict between her body as a somewhat autonomous 
signifying entity and the psychological strength she seeks and often 
finds through identifications with various members of her family. I 
argue that this conflict overlapped with her acceptance of a female 
gender identity. The sustained nature of this conflict prevented her from 
establishing a metric of what I will call ‘psychosomatic normality’, with 
disastrous consequences when she began to suffer the symptoms of 
acute endometriosis. I suggest further that the memoir shows the power 
of early life in determining how diseases are experienced subjectively, 
over time. 
Author contact details: as above 
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Introduction 
This is the second in a series of papers devoted to the body in life 
writing. Taking as my example Hilary Mantel’s memoir, Giving Up the 
Ghost (2003), I want to demonstrate how the relatively-underused 
discipline of psychoanalytic psychosomatics might help scholars of life 
writing to understand the role of the body in the development of 
selfhood.1 The paper is part of a long-term project on illness narrative 
which seeks to explore how far illness memoirs (or autosomatographies, 
to use G. Thomas Couser’s much better term) by highly-skilled writers 
might help us to understand what the experience of embodiment feels 
like, from the inside, in the West today.2 Growing up involves learning 
to cope with a wide range of bodily discomforts, even for healthy people. 
Such discomforts are part and parcel of what we might call 
psychosomatic normality. The point that literary autobiography 
illustrates so well is that bodily discomforts are never merely bodily just 
as psychological ones are never only mental. Both are compounds of the 
mental and the physical. Adapting to the rhythms of one’s 
psychosomatic reality is a productive process that enables the self to 
develop, not just the body; but this fact often escapes the attention of 
the healthy and the able-bodied because, as the physician-writer Eric 
Cassell so memorably put it, health is, among other things, ‘a mode of 
omnipotence’.3 I am particularly interested in autobiographies that lay 
bare the contribution that adapting to psychosomatic normality makes 
to selfhood. Life writing offers a valuable window onto the lived 
experience of psychosomatic normality and its vicissitudes.   
 
To date, the most important significant large-scale theoretical attempt 
to take account of the physical sources of selfhood is that of Paul John 
Eakin.4 Taking his bearings from the work of the neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio, Eakin is interested in the ways in which autobiographical 
memories survive as feeling-states to be elaborated in new contexts. 
Eakin’s implicit target was the poststructuralist claim that there is no 
necessary relationship between past and present selves. I want to 
broaden out Eakin’s model by considering the self as a psychophysical 
entity in relationship with other psychophysical entities. To fulfill this 
aim, I will appeal to concepts in psychoanalytic psychosomatics. 
 
Psychoanalytic psychosomatics studies the effects of relational 
experiences on mind and body alike.5 In Mantel’s memoir, this 
relational dimension is especially prominent. She sets endometriosis 
and the devastating effect it has had on her life in the context of her 
exceptionally difficult childhood. I will suggest that her bodily 
experiences were shot through with primitive, often unconscious, 
perceptions of the relationships within her family of origin; whenever 
she discovered new things about those relationships, she found she had 
to register the change through her body in some way. She periodically 
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defended herself from her mind by switching off from her body and 
from other people’s bodies, especially her mother’s (e.g. not noticing her 
mother was pregnant). These oscillations took place in the context of 
her growing acceptance of her female gender identity. There was, 
moreover, a special category of psychological experience which she 
connected with the supernatural; this changed her relationship with her 
body and which seemed to reinforce its tendency to debility. I will argue 
that supernatural experience was modelled on perceptions of her 
parents’ and step-parent’s relations with one another.  
 
There is no unified psychoanalytic theory of what Winnicott memorably 
called the ‘psychosomatic partnership’.6 Consequently, the 
psychoanalytic ideas I shall draw upon come from an eclectic set of 
sources. I will appeal to Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic 
somatic body and the symbolic somatic body but will add a Kleinian 
rider to it by insisting on the role of identification as a bulwark against 
the depredations of the semiotic.7 This is very marked in Giving Up the 
Ghost. I will also appeal to the idea of the shared body schema, first 
sketched out in detail by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, some version of which 
must underpin any version of psychoanalysis that sees the projection 
and introjection of bodily states as the most basic activity subtending all 
human life (i.e. all British variants). I will contend that the hardest 
struggle Mantel faced in early childhood was seeing her family of origin 
through her mother’s eyes. An intelligent, perceptive, imaginative child, 
who loved the rest of her family deeply, could only have been disturbed 
by what she saw. Developing a hypothesis by André Green concerning 
somatization in general, I will suggest that a factor that could have led 
Mantel to live out so much of her psychic life through her body was she 
did not feel able to communicate her deepest experiences of family life 
to her parents or stepfather. Internal and external reality were poorly 
differentiated in her case, because of the reign of secrecy that governed 
family life.  
 
The theories I shall advance will be set forth as plainly as I can, with 
only minimal recourse to psychoanalytic language, and they are 
intended as speculations only. For the avoidance of misunderstanding 
may I stress that in using the term ‘psychosomatics’ I disclaim any 
suggestion that Mantel’s endometriosis was in any sense caused by her 
sufferings as a child; but I do think childhood determined how she 
experienced the onset and development of that disease.  
 
I have tried to frame these speculations in the light of contemporary 
biomedical research too. I worked for many years as a researcher in 
epidemiology. Mantel’s memoir contains a great deal of richly-
contextualised psychosocial material that illustrates and amplifies the 
findings of epidemiological studies on the long-term impact of early life 
stress.8 I highlight this aspect of her work because I think it is 
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conceivable that in the future books like Mantel’s could come to play a 
more active role in medical research as generators and illustrators of 
hypotheses about the causes of illness and indeed of health. The 
interplay at the level of lived experience between the psychological and 
the physical is a primary focus for anthropologists of psychiatry such as 
Joan and Arthur Kleinman and Andrew J. Strathern and for theorists of 
narrative-based medicine; but it has received scant attention from 
literary scholars, even though literary autobiography is potentially an 
important source of information about that relationship.9 
 
In the first part of this essay, I will describe the nature of Mantel’s mind-
body interactions in early childhood, covering what she describes as the 
happiest part of her life, when she and her parents lived in her 
grandparents’ house. Young Hilary was especially fond of her 
grandfather, who doted on her. 10 Strikingly, she believed she would turn 
into a boy on her fourth birthday or not long afterwards. In the second 
part I will consider the events that occurred following a holiday to 
Blackpool. It was then that she realised that her mother and father were 
unhappily married. This perception coincided with, and perhaps 
precipitated, a weakening of her hopes of turning into a boy. She 
became sickly. When she was six, the family moved to a new house, on a 
street named Brosscroft, not far from her grandparents’ home. Fairly 
quickly her mother installed her lover, Jack Mantel, in the new house. 
Mantel’s real father went on living in the house for around five years. 
During this period of intense domestic strife, Hilary was constantly ill 
with colics, pains and fevers. The local GP nicknamed her ‘Little Miss 
Neverwell’. When she was seven, she had an experience in which she 
believed she could sense the presence of a supernatural creature, as high 
as a child of two, the embodiment of ‘some formless, borderless evil, 
that came to try to make me despair’ (107). As a result of this 
experience, she was ‘never the same… I was always doomy afterwards’. 
She became ‘a graceless being, abandoned’ (109). She passed the eleven-
plus exam in 1963 and the family, minus her father, moved to Cheshire. 
She never saw her father again. She attended an academically-ambitious 
Catholic school in Cheshire, where she won the respect of the 
headmistress, Sister Mary Francis, ‘Top Nun’.11 The last section will 
consider the events surrounding her voluntary admission as a 
psychiatric inpatient for symptoms that included mysterious pains 
throughout her body which were thought to be hysterical at the time but 
which were almost certainly caused by endometriosis.  
 
Embodied symbolic knowledge 
Julia Kristeva famously made a distinction between the semiotic 
somatic body, that is, the body which feels as though it can be acted 
upon by the world, and which takes the form of an awareness of 
sensation, and the symbolic somatic body, that is, the body through 
which a person acts upon the world so that she and it can be 
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experienced as meaningful. The symbolic somatic body arises out of our 
growing confidence that brute somatic experience can be contemplated 
from a variety of viewpoints. The more we are able to withstand our 
bodily experience, the easier it becomes to dwell upon, play with, and 
reconfigure. For this reason, the semiotic somatic body is always on the 
way to becoming symbolic. Now, obviously, the extension of the 
semiotic into the symbolic realm is one of the signal achievements of 
infancy. In the sixth chapter of Révolution du langage poétique (1974), 
which contains her most extended discussion of the somatic and the 
symbolic, Kristeva relates the symbolic body to the child’s emergence 
into Lacan’s symbolic order. She says that the child who learns to speak 
is faced with ‘a dramatic confrontation between positing-separating-
identifying and the semiotic chora [the body as we experience it from 
birth until the mirror stage which, according to Lacan, occurs when the 
child is aged between six and eighteen months]’.12 The semiotic body 
continues to exist in defiance of the symbolic as the repository of the 
pre-symbolic. Kristeva says that the differences between these two 
distinct states of the mind-body are especially significant in early 
childhood, when the symbolic body rises up out of the foundations of 
the somatic body for the first time. 
 
Kristeva’s distinction captures something central to Hilary Mantel’s 
account of the pains of her childhood experience. Giving Up the Ghost is 
full of moments in which young Hilary submits to a bodily experience 
that threatens to overwhelm her. Sometimes it does overwhelm her and 
sometimes she manages to tolerate it and to sense its vast symbolic 
potential. I think that in the passages dealing with her childhood, 
Mantel is centrally preoccupied with the point at which the semiotic 
body metamorphoses into the symbolic body, or fails to do so, and that 
these experiences retained exemplary significance for her when she 
became ill. Here is an example of a successfully managed experience of 
this kind: 
 
Evelyn’s house – the Aldous’s house – is darker than ours and has 
a more dumpling smell. Not being Catholics, they don’t have a 
piano, but as they are at the end of the common yard, they have a 
more tidy and well-arranged plot, with flower beds. Outside our 
house my granddad has grubbed out a bed for nasturtiums, and 
trained them up a wall. He calls them storshions … When I try to 
put names to their imperial colours, to the scarlet and striated 
amber, my chest seems dangerously to swell … 
(43) 
 
But just as often the proto-symbolic character of her experience is a 
source of tremendous anxiety to young Hilary. Near the beginning of the 
Giving Up the Ghost, Mantel talks of the ‘overwhelming sensory power’ 
of her early memories: ‘my early world was synaesthesic’, she writes, 
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‘and I am haunted by the ghosts of my own sense impressions, which re-
emerge when I try to write, and shiver between the lines’ (24, 23). She 
recalls the pain of learning to walk from her grandmother’s house to the 
house next door, owned and inhabited by her great-aunt, Annie Connor. 
There is a raised bluish stone and ‘perhaps because it is the colour of a 
bruise, I will fall and howl’ (29). To reach her destination, young Hilary 
had to pass a rusty iron ring: ‘Grandad says it is where they tied the 
monkey up but I don’t think they ever really had one; all the same, he 
lurks in my mind, a small grey monkey with piteous eyes and a long 
active tail’ (28). When she masters the journey, she compares the sound 
of the piano in the house next door with the sound of her grandmother’s 
piano. The piano in her great-aunt’s house makes a ‘bronchial, 
damaged’ sound. Whenever it is played, young Hilary stands next to it 
‘and feels the instrument resonating like a cat purring’ (29). The purring 
in turn reminds her of a cat belonging to Mrs Clayton, a neighbour 
whose husband had recently died. Mrs Clayton was so distressed by her 
bereavement that she had to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital. The 
climactic memory in this sequence occurs when young Hilary sits on the 
stairs eating a marzipan sweet and wonders if she’s swallowed a house-
fly which can only mean that she will die soon. ‘There is another 
possibility, which I turn and examine in my brain: perhaps the tickling 
in my throat is the sweet itself… The fear of death turns slowly in my 
chest cavity, like a stewpot lazily bubbling’. ‘After a while,’ Mantel 
writes,  
 
I am walking about in the room again. My resolve to die 
completely alone has faltered. I suppose it will take an hour or so, 
or I might live till evening. My head is still hanging. What’s the 
matter? I am asked. I don’t feel I can say. My original intention 
was not to raise the alarm; also, I feel there is shame in such a 
death. I would rather just fall over, and that’s about it. I feel 
queasy now. Something is tugging at my attention. Perhaps it is a 
sense of absurdity. The dry rasping in my throat persists, but now 
I don’t know if it is the original obstruction lodged there, or the 
memory of it, the imprint, which is not going to fade from my 
breathing flesh. For many years the word ‘marzipan’ affects me 
with its deathly hiss, the buzz in its syllables, a sepulchral fizz.  
(33) 
 
The bluish flagstone does not merely foretell a fall; it is the same as a 
fall and the accompanying sense of physical pain. The absent monkey 
who has to be borne in mind stands for something worse than a fall. The 
child’s mind cannot compass what might have happened to this 
creature. The bronchial-sounding piano and the cat’s purring are 
frightening because they lead to Mrs Clayton’s grief which again is 
beyond her ken. The episode with the sweet that might be a fly involves 
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an oscillation between the semiotic and a catastrophic version of the 
symbolic.  
 
In her classic article on symbolism, Hanna Segal suggests that symbols 
should always be thought of as a ‘three-term relation, i.e. a relation 
between the thing symbolized, the thing functioning as a symbol, and a 
person for whom the one represents the other’.13 Young children use 
symbols as a means of throwing off anxiety. In the examples just given, 
the monkey, the piano and the cat symbolize mental pain (and possibly 
death itself) and in so doing serve to distance young Hilary from the 
reality of those things. But the things symbolized remain a penumbral 
presence. It is not uncommon for young children to be overwhelmed by 
symbolic significance: to find that the symbol makes the thing 
symbolized more alive. The marzipan sweet that turns into a fly and 
back into a sweet again is an example. It is more threatening than the 
‘storshions’ because it brings forward a meaning that is attenuated in 
the other activities. I am suggesting that the mark of a successful symbol 
is that it lends itself to sublimation. The sweet is a better symbol of 
death than the fly because it pushes the idea of death further away.  
 
One of the peculiarities of Mantel’s early childhood was the frequency 
with which her body was required to bear witness to meanings that she 
was not intended to understand. A beautifully-described example takes 
place in Mantel’s grandmother’s house after the trip to Blackpool on 
which she registered her parents’ unhappiness. Her parents were 
playing chess.  
 
A noise rips open the air. My parents raise their heads. It is a 
motorcycle, unsilenced, tearing open the afternoon, snarling 
down the street: 60 miles an hour. It rattles the windows: it is 
loud enough to wake babies, to frighten dogs. Then in an instant it 
has passed us, the noise is fading to a snarl; changing and dying 
in no time at all, to a long and melancholy drone, to a sigh. No 
one has spoken. But we have heard. Someone clears their throat: 
not me. They shift in their chairs. Their heads droop again. The 
racket, the roar, lasted for seconds, but the inner ear replays it 
and cannot help: winding away, with an afternote like vapour on 
the breeze, down the long and winding road.   
 
I think I shall remember this. I shall remember this for ever; this 
dying note, the slanting light, their bent heads. It is a moment of 
pure self-consciousness, the foretaste of what is to come. I know, 
besides, that they are not looking at the chessboard; they are 
looking, covertly, at each other’s faces. 
(58-9) 
 
  8 
It is the sublimation of the symbolic meaning of the motorcycle that is 
most impressive here. The tearing apart of the afternoon heralds the 
sundering of the parents’ marriage and the roar of the motorcycle 
arouses a moment of shared recognition even as it drowns it out. As 
children, we cannot know which parts of our lives are destined to 
develop and which parts are not. While retaining a great deal of her own 
privacy Mantel manages to evoke in her readers what psychoanalysts 
call ‘memories in feeling’ - events whose emotional tone we can recall 
without always having a clear idea of their content.14 She also manages 
to bring to life with particular delicacy the impact of not knowing 
certain specific things. Few if any children aged three or four 
understand their bodies or their parents’ relationship or the other 
relationships that structure their home life. Mantel’s achievement, I 
think, is to give the reader an idea of what her inability to see these 
things straight felt like. Coleridge (with Wordsworth in mind, of course) 
once defined genius as “the carrying on of the freshness and feelings of 
childhood into the powers of manhood”.15 By that yardstick, the early 
parts of Giving Up the Ghost are very ingenious indeed. Particularly 
impressive to me is the sustained rendering of the unthinkable weighing 
on the little girl’s mind in the form of physical experiences.  
 
Early identifications 
Young Hilary seems to have found the thought of femininity to be 
unthinkable. Mantel does not tell her reader why she wanted to become 
a boy. All of the games remembered in the early part of the memoir 
involved imagining herself as male: a knight-errant or a priest. The 
person she seems to have most identified with during this period of her 
childhood was her grandfather. She notes that her grandfather had to be 
‘knight and commander’ to all the women in the extended family. ‘His 
possessions are a billycan, a notebook and pencil, his guard’s hat and his 
guard’s lamp. It is my ambition to be a railway guard’ (35). Her 
grandfather seems to have encouraged this identification, telling his 
granddaughter that he was unwilling to send her to nursery as she was 
too useful to him about the house.   
 
Now identifications take us squarely into the realm of Kristeva’s 
category of the symbolic somatic body because they require the subject 
to experience her own agency. I want to suggest, however, that in 
addition to the love of her grandfather, Mantel’s early identifications 
were driven by a need to keep certain aspects of her home life out of 
focus. More specifically, Mantel used her symbolic body as a buffer 
between herself and the world of adult unhappiness. 
 
Young Hilary was aware that her parents were very dissatisfied. They 
could not afford a home of their own, they could not get social housing 
because of anti-Catholic discrimination, and her in mother in particular 
seems to have been frustrated with her life.  
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 Thwarted, unhappy, she stayed in the mill and earned, she said, a 
wage as good as a man’s. The work was hard and took a painful 
toll on immature muscle and bone. It would be many years before 
the effects showed; then, with energy to spare, she danced and 
sang through her evenings, in amateur shows and pantomimes. 
Cinderella was her favourite part. Her favourite scene: the 
Transformation. She asked herself, could she really be the child of 
her parents? 
(50) 
 
In later years, the mother complained to her daughter about her 
parents’ ‘narrow and unimaginative’ nature (49). They had not allowed 
her to go to the grammar school where she would have thrived or 
entered her for a scholarship examination. They did not understand her 
wish to go to art college.   
 
In one of the drafts of Giving Up the Ghost that appeared in the London 
Review of Books but which was not included in the book, Mantel 
describes the day she first met her stepfather, Jack, when she was four 
years old. She had gone with her mother to the primary school where 
her mother worked in order to borrow a typewriter. On the way home, 
Hilary turned around and noticed her mother walking with a man. After 
they go home, her mother says to everyone, ‘guess who I saw, Jack 
Mantel, Jack Mantel.’  
 
 It is an appealing tale, the tale of guess-who-I-met. Yet no one 
stays or lingers. No one pauses in their everyday routine, which 
includes running in and out of each other’s houses every few 
minutes. There seems, in general, to be a stony response to my 
mother’s news. I met Jack Mantel, Jack Mantel, she says. Her 
head is thrown back, her hair rippling to her shoulders, her voice 
trilling with laughter. She stands with one pretty calf advanced, 
one foot rocking in her high-heeled shoe. Guess who I met? No 
one answers. Her voice rises high and hangs itself on one of the 
vacant cuphooks on the shelves above my grandmother’s kitchen 
table.16 
 
If this extract is authoritative, then Mantel’s mother’s relationship with 
Jack may have begun earlier than is apparent in the book. The memoir 
is more oblique. Mantel remarks that she lived in an environment where 
‘The true nature of things was frequently hidden. No one would say 
plainly what was what: not if they could help it’ (46). It is tempting to 
conjecture that in addition to the difficulties between her parents, there 
were also difficulties between her mother and her grandparents. These 
tensions, which simmered invisibly while the family lived in the 
grandparents’ house, quickly boiled over once they moved to Brosscroft.  
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The notion that she was fundamentally male also seems to have shielded 
young Hilary from knowing how unhappy her parents were. The link is 
first made when her parents take her for a holiday to Blackpool:  
 
Standing on the pier at Blackpool, I look down at the inky waves 
swirling. Again, the noise of nature, deeply conversational, too 
quick to catch; again the rushing movement, blue, deep, and far 
below. I look up at my mother and father. They are standing close 
together, talking over my head. A thought comes to me, so swift 
and strange it feels like the first thought that I have ever had. It 
strikes with piercing intensity, like a needle in the eye. The 
thought is this: that I stop them being happy. I, me and only me. 
That my father will throw me down the rocks, down into the sea. 
That perhaps he will not do it, but some impulse in his heart 
thinks he ought. For what am I, but a disposable, replaceable 
child, and without me, they would have a chance in life. (52) 
 
I view this scene in terms of Hilary’s projective identification with her 
father: unconsciously, Hilary believed he saw her as the known-but-
unknown Jack, and that he felt murderously angry with her as a 
consequence. But perhaps more important is the irruption of the 
semiotic body into the symbolic body.  
  
The next thing I am in bed with a fever raging. My lungs are full to 
bursting. The water boils, frets, spumes. I am limp in the power of 
the current that tugs beneath the waves. To open my eyes I have 
to force off my eyelids the weight of water. I am trying to die and I 
am trying to live. I open my eyes and I see my mother looking 
down at me. She is sitting swiveled towards me, her anxious face 
peering down. She has made a fence of Mrs Scott’s dining chairs, 
their backs to my bed, and behind this barrier she sits, watching 
me. Her wrists, crossed, rest on the backs of the chairs; her lady’s 
hands droop. For a minute or two I swim up from under the water 
clawing … I feel myself taken by the current, tugged away. I am 
changed now. Not in that fever but in one of the series, one of 
those that follow it, my weight of hair is cut off. What remains is 
like feathers, I think, like fluff. I lose my baby fat. For another 
twenty-five years I will be frail.    
(52-54) 
 
The symbolic body was a male body. When her parents’ misery forced 
itself upon her on Blackpool pier, her symbolic body was shattered and 
she was left with a semiotic body, acting upon her against her will. Her 
fantasy that she would turn into a boy lost a large share of its purpose, 
though that was not apparent to her at first. It seems clear that Hilary’s 
early difficulties with femininity were not based on denigration of the 
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female body. Some of the most extraordinary passages of Giving Up the 
Ghost describe how overpowered she was by her mother’s beauty. They 
were, I suggest, rooted in a reluctance to consider the relationships in 
her family from her mother’s point of view. She was aware that she 
needed her mother and she suspected her mother wanted to abandon 
her. She saw how opposed her grandparents were to her mother’s 
wishes generally. And, once Jack was on the scene, she had to confront 
her mother’s hostility to her father and vice versa. If being a boy 
afforded her a measure of protection from these realities, why would she 
not seize it? 
 
The conclusion of the scene is remarkable because it appears to hold out 
the promise of a reconstitution of a new symbolic body.  
 
For a minute or two, I swim up from under the water: clawing. I 
think, how beautiful she [my mother] is. Her face frames a 
question. It is never spoken. My mother has brought her own 
bedlinen, from home, and below my hot cheek, chafing it, is a 
butterfly: spreading luxurious wings, embroidered on the pillow 
case by my mother’s own hand. I see it, recognise it, put out my 
hot fingers to fumble at its edges. If I am with this butterfly, I am 
not lost but found. But I can’t stay. I am too hot, too sick. I feel 
myself taken by the current, tugged away. 
(53) 
 
This primary instance of illness is fundamental. Blackpool supplies the 
symbolic language for every subsequent collapse in the memoir.17 It also 
describes a kind of ‘arc’ of her imperfect recoveries from each 
subsequent episode of illness: the irruption of the semiotic body into the 
symbolic, followed by the precarious establishment of a new symbolic 
body based on identification with a different member of her family. 
 
The shared female body schema  
The embroidered butterfly is a symbol of her own female body and it is 
the occasion for one of the rare moments dealing with childhood in 
which Hilary appears to value her own femininity. In a previous paper, I 
suggested that one of the distinguishing marks of memoirs involving 
illness is the frequency with which the writer discovers unconscious 
somatic memories. In particular, the sick person finds that he or she 
shared a body schema with a person or persons who are important to 
them. Strikingly, we are just as likely to share a body schema with 
someone of the opposite sex as with someone of our own. This 
phenomenon has been studied by scholars in a wide variety of scientific 
and non-scientific fields. Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of 
mirror neurons in macaque monkeys, has proposed that whenever 
humans look at someone performing an action, our motor system 
becomes active as if we ourselves were executing the action in 
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question.18 A recent number of Behavioural and Brain Sciences was 
devoted to the theme of ‘Second-Person Neuroscience’ in support of this 
hypothesis.19 Gallese and his colleagues acknowledge the impact of 
research into infant development which infants as young as six hours 
appear to have a capacity to imitate those around them. Daniel N. Stern 
and Giannis Kugiumutzakis have described experiments in which a 
grown-up sticks out her tongue or opens her mouth at an infant and the 
infant does the same thing back.20 We know it’s not a reflex because 
infants don’t always do it; but they do it a great deal. The baby has to 
translate the experience of seeing someone into a proprioceptive 
impression which forms the basis of their imitation. They don’t look at 
their own tongues or hands or whatever it is they’re using to imitate the 
grown-up. They just do it. Seeing others’ actions give us a template for 
action. We do not consciously copy them; rather we discover that we 
have copied them through feeling and action. This is the most 
rudimentary form of intersubjectivity and it is rooted in 
intercorporeality. Philosophically, the father of these views is Husserl 
who emphasised that our capacity to share experiences with others 
turns on a process by which we simulate their experiences in our own 
bodies. Merleau-Ponty developed this claim by suggesting that at some 
level we are obliged to fuse our experience with that of other people. ‘In 
perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of 
action which pairs them [action à deux]. This conduct which I am able 
only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine; I recover 
[reprendre] it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I 
make myself can be the objects of another's intention. It is this transfer 
of my intentions to the other's body and of his intentions to my own, my 
alienation of the other and his alienation of me, that makes possible the 
perception of others.’21 I think this theory or one like it implicitly 
underpins Melanie Klein’s idea of projective identification for this last 
assumes that we can have, and at some level believe we do have, the 
same bodily experiences as other people, and that they can have and do 
have ours.22 The only additional claim I wish to make is that some 
shared body schemas become part of our long-term experiences of 
embodied selfhood and radically shape our sense of who we are. This 
can be seen very clearly in memoirs dealing with life-changing illness.  
 
Now it is plain from the early parts of Giving Up the Ghost that if Hilary 
felt her body was coupled with anyone else’s, it was her grandfather’s. 
Under his tutelage, she could move about in the world endowed with his 
power. Even the meals they ate seemed to confirm their connection in 
her mind: 
 
Grandad and I have special food, at different times from other 
people. When he comes off his shift he eats alone, tripe, rabbit, 
distinctive food that is for men. Around noon each day I take a 
lamb chop, and a slice of bread and butter. (45)  
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The illnesses she suffered post-Blackpool entailed losing his body as a 
happy source of representation for her own. She continued to play 
boyish games though increasingly these now felt like play to her. If 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the developmental significance of the 
shared body scheme is correct, it would have been impossible for Hilary 
to be at ease with her female body without an admired authoritative 
female figure near at hand whose bodily experience offered an attractive 
pattern for her own. The problem was that few things made Hilary more 
anxious than her mother’s body and its capacities. And yet precisely 
because her mother was such a source of anxiety she could not but 
dominate her daughter’s mind. 
 
Hilary had to come to terms with being female in a context in which she 
felt extremely unwell. The illnesses described are well-documented in 
the medical literature on childhood stress.23 Stress compromises the 
immune function, especially in early life. Fevers are commonplace, the 
result of an excessively active immune system. The normal cycle of hair 
growth ceases, leading to temporary hair loss (the phenomenon known 
as ‘telogen effluvium’). And the pains and fatigue mentioned could 
easily have been caused by excess cortisol in the body. The GP who 
nicknamed Hilary ‘Little Miss Neverwell’ appears to have been ignorant 
of the physiology of stress. But perhaps he was struck by the intense 
mutual involvement of mother and daughter during illness. Hilary 
feared her mother’s waywardness very much. Through illness, the 
mother appears to have identified with the daughter. Maybe it was a 
way of bestowing on her daughter the care of which she had felt 
deprived. At any rate the sick body was perhaps the first version of the 
shared female body schema.   
  
Hilary’s emerging sense of her body as female appears to have turned on 
two related intuitions: that it was less substantial than the male body 
and more prone to illness. Arguably the most disturbing feature of her 
life after Blackpool was the degree to which illness and femininity 
became constitutive of one another.  
 
I am only playing, inside the Indians tepee, and I know it. I have 
lost the warrior’s body I had before fever. My bullet-like presence, 
my solidity, has vanished. Ambiguity has thinned my bones, made 
me light and washed me out, made me speechless and made me 
blonde. I realise – and carry the dull knowledge inside me - that I 
am never going to be a boy now. I don’t exactly know why. I sense 
that things have slid too far, from some ideal starting point.  
(57) 
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A body made thin and translucent by illness was implicitly female. Here, 
for instance, is her description of her life at the moment when her 
parents quarrelled over Jack moving in.  
 
This is the worst time of my life: days of despair. I am on the pier 
at Blackpool, with the screaming gulls and the wind, looking 
down into the boiling sea. Words swirl over my head, words of 
loathing and contempt. A great hand lifts me; it is the hand of the 
law. And here is my punishment, coming now, coming now; I feel 
the rush of air against my face. The law picks me up into the wind, 
the law lets me go; I fall through space, and on the rocks my head 
smashes open like an egg. The sea drinks my yellow blood. 
(84-5) 
 
When she was actually in Blackpool her worry was about being disposed 
of, violently. Now the focus is on her body disgorging its sickly-sounding 
contents (yellow blood). From this point on, the memoir has a great deal 
to say about internal bodily spaces. The Maudsley psychoanalyst Henri 
Rey thought that the consciousness of internal bodily spaces was the 
defining feature of the sense of femininity. 24 It is striking how often 
Mantel refers to the insides of her body in her account of her life in 
Brosscroft.  
 
The memoir is quite brilliant on how these conflicts about her own body 
took shape around her relationship with her mother. As relations with 
the rest of the family worsened, Hilary oscillated between identifying 
with her mother and cutting off from her. Identification took four main 
forms: 1) imaginative play in which she directly imitated her mother25; 
2) a deepening sense of herself as the child of parents who didn’t 
understand her (echoing her mother’s experience of her parents); 3) 
unconscious projective identification with her mother’s hidden life26; 
and 4) as she moved into adolescence, a desire to vindicate her mother’s 
thwarted academic ambitions. She also tried, with some success, to 
switch off from her body. She became a feared playground fighter at 
school (‘[my body] has no capabilities and no capacities, except to be in 
the way, to be where it’s not wanted’). She cut off from her senses and 
again, as if to confirm Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the use of a shared 
body schema, the point of cutting off from her senses was to blunt her 
sense of her mother’s body. For a time, she couldn’t hear what her 
mother said to her, forgot the colour of her mother’s hair, and failed to 
notice when her mother was pregnant (65).  
 
The final acceptance of femininity seems to have been occurred for 
Hilary in the climactic episode of the chapter entitled ‘The Secret 
Garden’. Shortly before her First Communion, Hilary ‘carried a simple 
space for God inside me: a jagged space surrounded by light, a waiting 
space cut out of my solar plexus’. This space was invaded by the vision 
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of the evil spirit which seems to have come to her not so much through 
her eyes as through her heaving stomach and her sense of touch: 
 
My eyes are drawn to a spot beyond the yard, beyond its gate, a 
spot in the long garden… I can’t see anything, not exactly see: 
except the faintest movement, a ripple, a disturbance of the air. I 
can sense a spiral, a lazy buzzing swirl, like flies; but it is not flies. 
There is nothing to see. There is nothing to smell. There is 
nothing to hear. But its motion, its insolent shift, makes my 
stomach heave. I can sense—at the periphery, the limit of all my 
senses—the dimensions of the creature. It is as high as a child of 
two. Its depth is a foot, fifteen inches. The air stirs around it, 
invisibly. I am cold, and rinsed by nausea. I cannot move. I am 
shaking; as if pinned to the moment, I cannot wrench my gaze 
away. I am looking at a space occupied by nothing... Within the 
space of a thought, it is inside me, and has set up a sick resonance 
within my bones and in all the cavities of my body. 
 (106-7) 
After this vision, she was ‘never the same… I was always doomy 
afterwards’. She became ‘a graceless being, abandoned’ (109).  
 
I want to make two suggestions about this scene. First, this encounter 
with a supernatural being was based on a fantasy of impregnation by, 
and with, a creature the height of a child of two. At the time this scene 
took place, the older of her two brothers, Ian, was two years old.27 The 
scene is thus fundamentally one in which Hilary identifies with her 
mother’s body. It is about the psychological cost of protecting her 
mother from knowing how disturbed she (Hilary) had been by what her 
mother did to her family. More specifically, the intensely curious part of 
the little girl avoids communicating to her mother how damaging she 
finds adult sexuality by projecting all her own hatred (and the hatred 
she believes her mother’s sexuality contains) into her sibling. She is 
relating to her mother but the line of contact is distorted by the 
projection that turns her sibling into an evil spirit. If on Blackpool Pier 
she learned that no amount of thinking she was a boy could remedy her 
parents’ unhappiness, in the Secret Garden, she intuited that being 
female meant having a body that is either vulnerable to requisition by 
others (men, babies, supernatural entities) or that can draw others into 
its own vortex and that this peculiarity is based on their having 
distinctive internal bodily space.28 Again, the result of this intuition is 
the destruction of her (female) symbolic body as a source of happy 
representation. It is, perhaps, the moment in which the permanence of 
her link with her mother’s body became apparent to Hilary. It is as if, 
from this point, Hilary stopped expecting to feel well. As a result of this 
vision, she writes, she was ‘never the same… I was always doomy 
afterwards’. Elsewhere, Mantel has written movingly about the impact 
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of chronic pain on her personality and intellect, beginning in 
childhood.29  
 
My second observation is more speculative and I will explain it fully 
only in the next part of this essay. The religious terms in which she 
perceived her plight may have come from her Catholic grandmother. 
The tainted version of herself she was left with involved an 
identification with her grandmother’s image of her mother. Yet again, 
we find identification being used as a bulwark against the complete 
destruction of her symbolic body but it is a double identification with 
mother and grandmother, offering no clear resolution, not unlike her 
‘trying to die and trying to live’ in Mrs Scott’s boarding house.  
 
Perhaps I might make a general point about the meaning of the 
supernatural in Giving Up the Ghost. Many commentators have drawn 
attention to Mantel’s metaphoric use of the word ‘ghost’ in the memoir. 
She talks about the ‘ghosts’ of the children she never had and of the boy 
she never became as negative existences that continue to define her. 
This version of ghostliness will offend no one. In what is perhaps the 
best discussion of the topic, Alan Radley suggests that ‘Mantel’s ghosts 
are misunderstood if they are interpreted either as objects or as 
hallucinations. They are key mediators of the work that is her story’.30 
Although I heartily concur with him on the last point, every reader of 
Giving Up the Ghost has to confront the fact that Mantel gives us ghosts 
in an objective, hallucinatory form and it is these which are most 
troublesome (including for this writer). I think that ghosts that caused 
havoc in Brosscroft enabled the little girl to register a point of view that 
dominated family life but which was seldom openly proclaimed. This 
point of view had to do with the passions and apprehensions generated 
by the adults’ unusual living arrangements. Believing in ghosts was a 
way of registering those passions without having to allude to them 
directly. This can be seen in the passage in which the word ghosts first 
makes its appearance in family life: 
 
 The dogs, who are no longer puppies, squeal with fear in the 
night. My mother comes down to them, shivering in her 
nightdress, and sees their hackles raised, their thin forms 
shrinking against the dawn light. One night, I hear my mother 
and Jack, discussing. I am lurking in the cold Glass Place, coming 
in from the lavatory. ‘Well,’ she says, coming in from the lavatory. 
‘Well,’ she says, ‘so? So what do you think it is?’ Her voice rises, in 
an equal blend of challenge, fear and scorn. Ghosts?’ She has 
spoken my thoughts: which I thought were unspeakable. The 
hairs rise on the back of my neck.   
 (95-6) 
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In an important interview with Eileen J. Pollard for this journal, Mantel 
remarked that she believes in ghosts ‘for practical purposes’.31 The 
‘practical purposes’ in question were about getting hold of the emotional 
currents all around her and making as much sense of them as she could, 
without betraying their overwhelming power. It was almost inevitable 
that it should be bound up with sexuality.  
 
Endometriosis 
In 1970, Mantel won a place to read Law at the London School of 
Economics but transferred to Sheffield the following year, to be near her 
boyfriend and future husband. There she reported ‘a pain which I could 
not explain; it seemed to wander about my body, nibbling here, stabbing 
there, flitting every time I tried to put my finger on it’ (149). Many years 
later she established that these pains were almost certainly caused by 
endometriosis, a notoriously difficult condition to diagnose, especially 
in 1970, but as her doctors could find no physical cause for them at the 
time, they concluded that they were probably psychogenic. Her GP put 
her on tricyclic antidepressants; her pains continued. She was then sent 
to see a psychiatrist, Dr G. Dr G thought she was a hysteric. He said her 
ailments stemmed from the fact that she was a law student. The law, he 
told her, was too intellectually demanding a subject for a woman, 
especially one as conscientious as Mantel. He advised her to give up her 
studies and to get a job in a dress shop, like her mother (170). (Her 
mother was in fact a fashion buyer for a major department store in 
Manchester.) Dr G prescribed Valium; but instead of tranquillizing her, 
Mantel found that the drug made her furious: she wanted to burn down 
buildings. She admitted herself into the care of a psychiatric unit as a 
voluntary patient, to reduce the likelihood of committing arson. Dr G 
thought she was sliding rapidly into psychosis and he put her on 
antipsychotics to which she had an akathisic, psychotic, adverse 
reaction. It took several weeks for her doctors to see that her psychosis 
was iatrogenic. She resolved to endure her pains and to steer clear of 
psychiatrists forever. Her endometriosis worsened until she diagnosed it 
herself some eight years later by which time it was too late to save her 
womb.  
 
Many of the first reviews of Giving Up the Ghost presented this episode 
as the most significant event in the whole memoir. ‘The more I said that 
I had a physical illness, the more they said I had a mental illness’ (171) 
became the most quoted sentence from the book. Mantel’s account of 
those terrible days is masterly. But I suspect a further reason why 
endometriosis came to dominate the reviews was that readers felt 
competent to judge what had actually gone wrong on that occasion in a 
way that they didn’t when considering the events in the Secret Garden 
or on Blackpool Pier. The injustice with which Mantel was treated by 
her psychiatrist allowed them to disown the much more elliptical and 
diffuse aspects of Mantel’s narrative. It has to be conceded that at 
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certain points in the memoir, Mantel seems to encourage this approach. 
She suggests, for instance, that the pains she complained of as a girl 
were early pathognomonic signs of what would develop into 
endometriosis (187). The memoir exhibits a strange and surprising 
openness to biomedical explanation from this point on. But, as Sara L. 
Knox has rightly pointed out, nowhere does Mantel recant the 
supernatural account of her infirmities offered in the previous chapter.32  
 
The idea that Mantel had a concurrent psychiatric condition was not 
far-fetched. She concedes as much herself. ‘I was labouring under a 
violent sense of injustice that may have seemed unreasonable to the 
people around me; I was angry, tearful and despairing, and I still had 
pains in my legs’ (170). There was, moreover, an important relational 
context surrounding the onset of Mantel’s pains which, so far as I am 
aware, was not picked up by any of the reviewers. In 1972, Mantel 
decided to get married. Jack and her mother disapproved of her 
marriage and refused to sign her grant forms in protest. The mysterious 
pain, which she could not explain, occurred only after the rupture with 
Jack and her mother. Mantel appears to have experienced her 
undiagnosed illness as a repetition of some of the most traumatic 
aspects of her sufferings as a child. At the most basic level, 
endometriosis revived and amplified the colics and cramps and fevers 
that afflicted her from the age of 5 until she was well into her teens 
(134). Its onset coincided with a collapse in her relationship with her 
mother and Jack, just as the non-specific illnesses of her childhood 
began when the conflicts between her mother and the rest of the family 
broke out into the open. Dr G’s response to her pains invited 
comparison with that of the GP who called her Little Miss Neverwell. It 
was bad enough that he was unwilling to explore a physical origin for 
her complaint. In claiming that her pains were hysterical - that they had 
been caused by a refusal to take her mother as her model and to put 
herself in what he plainly saw as a male gender role (that of a lawyer) - 
he was ignoring the highly-charged meanings that male and female 
roles had had for Mantel throughout her childhood.  
 
The relational context also matters because it shaped Mantel’s 
experience of her pains. It can be seen to inflect all the symptoms 
Mantel attributes to psychiatric medications. Consider this description 
of her response to Valium.  
 
Valium, however, did work; it worked to damage me… One day I 
sat by the hearth at Roebuck Road and imagined myself starting 
fires – not in my own chimney, but fires in the houses of 
strangers, fires in the streets. Somewhere along the line, I seemed 
to have been damaged; I imagined myself doing damage, in my 
turn. I knew these thoughts were not rational, but I was obliged to 
entertain them; day by day I smouldered in a sullen fury, and 
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when I saw a carving knife I looked at it with a new interest. I 
agreed to the clinic because I thought that, if I were to act on my 
impulses, someone would see me and stop me – before, at least, it 
got to arson and stabbing, and the deaths of strangers who had 
never harmed me at all. 
(172) 
 
Two of Mantel’s female relatives had died in fires: her paternal 
grandmother (who, significantly given the conflict generated by 
Mantel’s marriage, called off her wedding because she saw a ghost), and 
a relative of her mother, ‘a little girl called Olive who burned to death 
when her nightdress caught alight’ (26). Perhaps Mantel’s wish to start 
fires was a way of expressing her feeling that, like Olive and her 
grandmother, she was being consigned to her family’s damaged past. In 
Mantel’s first two novels, Muriel Axon, a character Mantel has said she 
based on herself, stabs herself with a pair of scissors and sets fire to the 
house she grew up in, which is full of ghosts (the house is plainly 
modelled on Brosscroft).33 
 
Many critics have commented eloquently on Mantel’s first attempt to 
write herself back to health during her stay on the psychiatric ward.34 
This took the form of a short story. Here is how she explained it to Dr G.  
 
And what was it about? A woman who believes her baby has been 
taken away and a substitute provided in its place. I see, said Dr G, 
and where and when did this occur? In rural Wales, I said, funnily 
enough. (I’d never been to Wales.) I don’t have to say the date but 
it feels like the early 192os. I mean judging by their furniture and 
clothes. Does it? said Dr G. It’s a time well before social 
insurance, anyway, I said. The doctor won’t come up the 
mountain to see them because they can’t pay. I see, said Dr G. 
And how does it end? Oh, badly. 
(173-4)  
 
The next time Mantel saw Dr G, he forbade her to write. But what are we 
to make of this story? I suggest it is an attempt to see her mother from 
her grandmother’s point of view. Mantel’s mother was born in 
December 1926, a little after ‘the early 1920s’ but close enough.35 We 
know too that she saw herself as a changeling: ‘Cinderella was her 
favourite part. Her favourite scene: the Transformation. She asked 
herself, could she really be the child of her parents? Or some changeling 
princess, dropped into Bankbottom by accident?’ (50). The Welsh 
setting too is significant. Mantel recalls that when she was growing up,  
 
All my behaviour seemed to anger [Jack], just by the fact of being 
behaviour… I felt as if I were a survival, a relic, a small squat 
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subject race, whose aboriginal culture was derided; like the 
Welsh, for example, a nation for whom Jack had no time at all.  
(143-4) 
 
Wales here is surely a metaphor for Mantel’s grandparents’ household. 
From Jack’s standpoint, it was a contemptible, aboriginal place.  
Mantel has said that the story she wrote during her psychiatric 
admission supplied the nucleus of her first two published novels, Every 
Day Is Mother’s Day (1985) and Vacant Possession (1986). It is striking 
though that those novels are about three generations. In Every Day Is 
Mother’s Day, Muriel Axon, a ‘mildly retarded’ young woman kills her 
child, whom her mother says is a changeling, to prevent her mother 
from taking it away from her. The reason no doctor comes to see her 
during her pregnancy is that her mother will not allow it. Her mother 
wants to control the pregnancy herself. Her chief rival is the state as 
represented by the local authority’s department of Social Services. 
(Muriel Axon goes on to kill her mother.) When Mantel first presented 
at the Student Health Centre, she and her doctors wondered if she was 
pregnant. Throughout the chapter dealing with her endometriosis, there 
are hints that an important but unacknowledged function of psychiatry 
and gynaecology is to demonstrate that the female body and everything 
it is capable of can be controlled by overwhelming force. Changelings 
represent the ultimate proof of this state of affairs: a mother whose child 
is taken away from her is deprived of the creativity of her own body. In 
an interview given in 1997, Mantel commented that  
 
It's a strange thing to say, considering that Muriel is a mentally 
defective murderess, but I really think that Muriel is me in that 
relationship, who can only cope by closing her eyes, closing her 
ears and … I think that if I go back to my childhood, probably the 
relationship between myself and my mother was negotiated very 
badly... it was a very long and painful process for me to see what 
that book was about. And once I got to the end of Every Day is 
Mother's Day Muriel had in effect murdered a child to stop it 
being taken by her mother... Muriel has never gained a sense of 
her own personality, she has no self, because her mother has not 
allowed her to have a self.36  
 
Perhaps some similar deprivation was the chief cause of Mantel’s anger 
when she was a young woman.  
 
In a lengthy critique of the Paris School of Psychosomatics, the late 
André Green argued that some people are compelled to live out their 
conflicts through their bodies because of excessive mentalisation (the 
Paris School focused on cases of insufficient mentalisation).37 Such 
people are often required by parents to deny reality. Green suggested 
that this leads to a shrinkage of the preconscious mind, the mind they 
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can go back to, to turn things over at their own pace. The distinction 
between internal and external reality is harder to maintain as a result. It 
seems to me unquestionable that Mantel was forced to live out a great 
deal of her emotional life through her body and that, because of the 
reign of secrecy at home concerning her parents’ living arrangements, 
she was required to deny reality both in the home and outside it, more 
or less constantly. Green says it is impossible to understand 
psychosomatic structures without recourse to the concept of ‘negative 
hallucination’ (denial of reality). Mantel’s tragedy is that the 
psychosomatic structure of her early home life robbed her of a standard 
of normality to apply to her pains. The pain she was left with long after 
leaving the psychiatric ward became the heir to countless childhood 
bafflements. It reached back to the childhood growing pains that her GP 
thought were psychosomatic; to the collapse of her family relationships 
at the age of seven (never to be discussed in public at all or in private 
very much); and in the psychiatric phase of her illness career, to the 
neurotic fears she found so real in early childhood. Her physicians’ 
denial that she had a physical illness can only have resonated with her 
early experience of having to be silent about her home life, a reticence 
that covered over so much loss for her. 
 
In a fine essay on chronic pain and autobiography, Leigh Gilmore 
observes that ‘pain shapes the relationships we have to our bodies and 
with others’.38 Giving Up the Ghost, which Gilmore singles out for 
special praise, illustrates this point with peculiar virtuosity. If we survey 
Mantel’s illness career up to her first hospital admission, we find that 
pain occupies the place previously taken by confidence about how 
matters stood within her family of origin. Pain is a means of retaining 
some of the status quo ante, albeit on worse terms. Of course, once she 
diagnosed the cause of her pains, she was able to separate them from 
her family life. But she did not always choose to do so. Early in the 
memoir, she describes visits that she and her husband used to make to 
her mother and Jack in Norfolk in the early 1990s. Jack, we are told, 
had recently had a coronary bypass. 'Routinely, as we left,' Mantel 
writes, 'there was a small ache behind my ribs' (18). Pain it seems still 
retained an object-relational significance.  
 
Her physicians’ failure to diagnose the cause meant she had to carry it 
around the same way she carried around the memory of the evil spirit 
and the fizzing of the fly on the staircase: as a frightening somatic 
experience, expanding into something psychologically vast. So ingrained 
is this way of dealing with the vicissitudes of life that medical language 
has almost no purchase over it. Mantel cannot say that it isn’t her 
stepfather’s ghost she sees in her house in Norfolk because migraine 
auras were something she learned about long after her psychosomatic 
habits had been settled. She has to credit ghosts with a modicum of 
reality because ghosts are part of her own habitual mode of dialogue 
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with herself, a mode that took shape in early childhood. Without them, 
she wouldn’t be who she is.  
 
Medicine today finds itself in a peculiar position. Evidence from studies 
in epigenetics, epidemiology and infant research points to the power of 
childhood psychological experience in determining adult health. At the 
same time, medicine as it is practiced in hospitals, though officially 
wedded to a form of mind-body monism, in practice assigns little 
significance to mental functioning, which is always reduced to biology. 
Without denying the successes of biomedicine, books like Mantel’s show 
why interiority is so important. Interiority, understood diachronically 
and from a developmental point of view, plays a powerful role in 
shaping illness experience and can also decisively affect the course of a 
disease process.  I ended my previous paper by suggesting that first-
person memoirs offer theorists of life-writing and others the 
opportunity to challenge the anti-mental bias of modern biomedicine by 
reclaiming the whole experiential field in which illness occurs in the 
West today. I hope I have demonstrated that Mantel’s memoir makes a 
vital contribution to that task.  
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